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INTRODUCTION 
On August 17, 2013, the New York Times published a front page story on 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. that cast the firm at the center of an international 
bribery scandal and sparked a media firestorm.1 The article reported that the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had opened a bribery 
investigation into the firm’s hiring practices in China pursuant to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),2 a statute that regulates bribery and 
public corruption in foreign countries.3 The story continued to garner 
national attention in the weeks following the article’s release, especially 
after the Department of Justice (DOJ) joined the SEC’s investigation.4 At 
the center of the controversy was the unusual nature of the investigation 
itself: unlike most FCPA bribery investigations, which target financial 
 
1 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess & David Barboza, Hiring in China by JPMorgan 
Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2013, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Silver-Greenberg, Protess & 
Barboza, Hiring in China by JPMorgan] (reporting that the SEC was investigating JPMorgan 
Chase’s hiring practices in China).  
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). 
3 See id.; Silver-Greenberg, Protess & Barboza, Hiring in China by JPMorgan, supra note 1.  
4 See, e.g., Cynthia Koons, J.P. Morgan Looks into Its Hiring Practices in Asia, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 29, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324009304579042 
432300112344, archived at http://perma.cc/6UDQ-6XQL (reporting JPMorgan’s internal 
investigation); Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Bribe Probe Said to Expand in Asia as Spreadsheet Is Found, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2013, 11:51 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-29/jpmorgan-
bribe-probe-said-to-expand-in-asia-as-spreadsheet-found.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3HFL-
EZBC (publicizing allegations that DOJ had joined the SEC in investigating JPMorgan’s hiring 
practices in China); Anjani Trivedi, JPMorgan China Hiring Practices Investigation Spreads to Asia, 
TIME (Aug. 30, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/08/30/jpmorgan-china-hiring-practices-
investigation-spreads-to-asia, archived at http://perma.cc/74G6-C657 (describing how the “scrutiny” 
of certain Chinese employees in JPMorgan “has . . . spread across [Asia]”).  
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payments to foreign officials in exchange for business advantages,5 the 
central issue underpinning the JPMorgan investigation was the firm’s 
apparent practice of hiring well-connected children of Chinese business and 
political leaders.6 More specifically, the government’s investigation targeted 
the firm’s “Sons and Daughters” program in China, a hiring program that 
allegedly favored children of Chinese owners of state-controlled enterprises 
in China.7 JPMorgan purportedly relied on this hiring process to gain a 
competitive advantage in China, where state-owned enterprises dominate 
the economy.8  
Although most media reports on the JPMorgan investigation 
characterize it as an unusual approach for the government,9 probes into 
corporate hiring practices are part of an increasingly apparent trend in 
FCPA enforcement.10 About eight months after the JPMorgan investigation 
began, DOJ and the SEC sent letters to at least five other financial 
institutions, requesting information on their hiring practices in Asia.11 
Federal agencies have justified these types of “relationship hire” 
investigations as well within the scope of the FCPA.12 The FCPA prohibits 
the exchange of “anything of value” with foreign officials for any “improper 
advantage”—language that appears to encompass offers of employment to 
relatives of foreign officials. 13  Critics of the FCPA’s application to 
 
5  See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions,  
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2014.html (last visited May 11, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DVM4-25BY (highlighting recent FCPA cases). 
6 See Silver-Greenberg, Protess & Barboza, Hiring in China by JPMorgan, supra note 1 
(“Federal authorities have opened a bribery investigation into whether JPMorgan Chase hired the 
children of powerful Chinese officials to help the bank win lucrative business in the booming 
nation . . . .”). 
7 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, For China Elite, JPMorgan Jobs on Easy Track, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at A1 [hereinafter Silver-Greenberg & Protess, China Elite].  
8 Keith Bradsher, China’s Grip on Economy Will Test New Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, 
at A4.  
9 See, e.g., Tracy Alloway & Jamil Anderlini, JPMorgan’s China Hiring Under Scrutiny, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/799f837e-0816-11e3-badc-00144feab 
dc0.html#axzz312clIo00, archived at http://perma.cc/N7JL-2K7U (remarking that U.S. authorities 
have “rarely investigated Wall Street’s business practices in China”).  
10 See infra Section I.C.  
11 See Enda Curran & Jean Eaglesham, Regulators Step Up Probe into Bank Hiring, WALL ST. 
J., May 7, 2014, at A1 (reporting that the SEC has sent letters to Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and UBS “seeking more information about their hiring in Asia”).  
12 See infra Section II.B.  
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012). 
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relationship hires have questioned the government’s reading of the Act’s 
language, characterizing it as an “aggressive” interpretation.14  
Despite the publicity surrounding the JPMorgan scandal, very little 
scholarship has examined relationship hires as an issue that defines and tests 
the limits of future FCPA enforcement. This Comment begins this 
discussion by analyzing both the rationale for the government’s application 
of the FCPA to relationship hires and the implications of this type of 
FCPA enforcement.  
Part I of this Comment presents the legislative history of the FCPA, 
focusing specifically on who and what Congress intended to regulate when 
it passed the Act in 1977. Part I also provides a brief description of the 
FCPA’s antibribery provision, which serves as the statutory basis for the 
government’s investigations into corporate hiring practices in foreign 
countries. Part II introduces the relationship hire issue by focusing on the 
highly publicized probe into JPMorgan’s hiring program in China. By 
comparing the unusual nature of this investigation with the government’s 
previous relationship hire investigations, Part II shows that federal agencies 
are broadening the range of hiring practices subject to FCPA scrutiny. Part 
III explores the implications of this expansion, arguing that while sham or 
“no show” employment agreements resemble the type of bribery that the 
FCPA is supposed to regulate, the government’s current approach produces 
troublesome legal and policy consequences. The government’s expansive 
reading of the FCPA in recent relationship hire investigations runs contrary 
to congressional intent. The government’s interpretation is also likely to 
raise a number of policy concerns. In particular, the government’s new 
position threatens to undermine U.S. business relationships overseas, 
concentrate power in the hands of prosecutors at the expense of the 
judiciary, and provoke accusations of American imperialism in foreign 
nations. This Comment concludes by arguing that, while DOJ and the SEC 
should continue to use the FCPA as a tool to combat hiring practices that 
serve as bribes, both agencies should refrain from using the law to target 
foreign hiring practices that do not resemble sham employment programs.  
 
14 Neil Irwin, Did JPMorgan Commit Bribery by Hiring the Kids of Chinese Politicians?, WASH. 
POST. (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/19/did-jpmorgan-
commit-bribery-by-hiring-the-kids-of-chinese-politicians, archived at http://perma.cc/GW4V-ZLKT; 
see also Arthur Levitt, “Influence Peddling” Makes the World Go Round, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2013, at 
A13 (asserting that relationship hire investigations are “scurrilous and hypocritical”). 
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE FCPA 
A. Legislative History 
1. Congress Intended the FCPA to Address Government Leaders 
The FCPA prohibits certain individuals and corporations from offering 
or authorizing the giving of “anything of value” to foreign officials to 
influence their official actions.15 Although the Act bars bribery of foreign 
officials, it was domestic events that inspired its passage. After Watergate, 
several federal authorities, including the Office of the Watergate Special 
Prosecutor, the SEC, and Senator Frank Church’s Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations, conducted large-scale investigations into the 
financial activities of U.S. corporations in foreign countries.16 In May 1976, 
the SEC released its first survey on the status of foreign corporate 
payments, which reported problems including 
falsifications of corporate financial records, designed to disguise or conceal 
the source and application of corporate funds misused for illegal purposes, 
as well as the existence of secret “slush funds” disbursed outside the normal 
financial accountability system. These secret funds were used for a number 
of purposes, including in some instances, questionable or illegal foreign 
payments. These practices cast doubt on the integrity and reliability of the 
corporate books and records which are the very foundation of the disclosure 
system established by the federal securities laws.17  
 Soon after the report was released, Congress conducted several hearings 
to evaluate the extent of U.S. corporate bribery in foreign countries.18 The 
 
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2012). 
16 See, e.g., Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings on H.R. 15481, S. 3664, H.R. 13780 and H.R. 
13953 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign 
Commerce, 94th Cong. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Foreign Payments Disclosure] (statement of Rep. John 
M. Murphy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & 
Foreign Commerce); see also, e.g., id. at 140 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz); Mike Koehler, 
The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 932 (2012). See generally S. REP. 
NO. 105-277, at 1 (1998) (summarizing post-Watergate congressional efforts to identify bribery by 
U.S. companies).  
17 SEC, 94TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON 
QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 3 (Comm. Print 1976) 
(submitted to the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs).  
18 See, e.g., The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) [hereinafter 
American Multinational Corporations Abroad] (statement of Rep. Robert N.C. Nix, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations); see also Foreign Payments 
Disclosure, supra note 16, at 1. 
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hearings focused on the donations of major American companies—including 
Lockheed, Northrop, and Gulf Corp.—to the political campaigns of foreign 
leaders.19 These sessions show Congress’s primary intention was to use the 
Act to “combat the foreign policy implications of American companies 
bribing foreign public officials.”20 For example, in the Gulf Oil hearing, 
Congress focused on the company’s payments to the President of the 
Republic of Korea,21 while in the Lockheed hearing, Congress highlighted 
the aerospace firm’s contributions to Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei 
Tanaka and Italian political parties.22 In characterizing these payments as a 
source of concern, Congress emphasized their ability to “embarrass friendly 
governments, lower the esteem for the United States among the citizens of 
foreign nations, and lend credence to the suspicions sown by foreign 
opponents of the United States.”23 These statements underscore Congress’s 
focus on political leaders operating in the public context.  
Although there were other social and political trends during this period 
that influenced the congressional support for the FCPA,24 the legislative 
record makes clear that Congress’s biggest priority was regulating relations 
between U.S. corporations and foreign government leaders.25 The focus on 
foreign public officials was also apparent in the two legislative proposals 
that eventually formed the FCPA, which focused explicitly on transactions 
with foreign governments and officials.26  
 
19 See American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 18, at 2, 127 (statement of Rep. 
Robert N.C. Nix, Chairman, Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations). 
20 Court E. Golumbic & Jonathan P. Adams, The “Dominant Influence” Test: The FCPA’s 
“Instrumentality” and “Foreign Official” Requirements and the Investment Activity of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 8 (2011). 
21 See American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 18, at 2 (statement of Rep. 
Robert N.C. Nix, Chairman, Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations).  
22 See Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 16, at 2 (statement of Rep. John M. Murphy, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign 
Commerce); see also Golumbic & Adams, supra note 20, at 7 n.40.  
23 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 5 (1977).  
24 While the SEC report and the 1976 congressional hearings served as specific catalysts for 
the FCPA, the Act resulted from a combination of many historical factors, including “post-
Watergate morality,” concerns regarding the economic ramifications of bribery, and Congress’s 
desire to lead a global movement against public corruption. Koehler, supra note 16, at 938. These 
forces together increased support for regulation to curb the influence of corporate bribery in 
foreign markets. Id. 
25 See id. (“[F]oreign policy was the primary policy concern from the discovered foreign 
corporate payments which motivated Congress to act.”).  
26 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (suggesting that foreign officials means government 
and political leaders); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 17 (1977) (indicating that the law targets payments to 
“an official of a foreign government,” “an official of a foreign political party,” or “a candidate for 
foreign political office”).  
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By contrast, the legislative record does not show any evidence of 
congressional intent to regulate “acts of bribery in the private context.”27 
Although media reports published during this period discussed the role of 
family members in corporate bribery schemes, Congress did not mention or 
identify family members in any of the bills or legislative proposals devoted 
to the drafting of FCPA.28 This is unsurprising given that nepotism was a 
“widespread practice” within Congress in the 1970s, and it is possible that 
the members of Congress did not consider the issue of relationship hires as 
particularly salient.29  
The legislative history of the Act also shows that Congress did not 
intend to use the FCPA to regulate state-owned enterprises. The absence of 
any reference to these entities in the final legislative proposals for the Act 
was not due to a lack of oversight; Congress was well aware that state-
owned enterprises existed in foreign markets and that many of the illegal 
payments discovered by the SEC in 1976 were made to these enterprises.30 
Although some of the initial bills designed to regulate foreign corporate 
payments did attempt to include leaders of state-owned enterprises in the 
definition of a foreign official,31 Congress did not adopt the language—
perhaps because the definition was too “ambiguous.”32 The omission of the 
language in the final legislation shows that the scope of the Act was 
confined to foreign government leaders and that Congress did not intend to 
broaden its scope to include government-controlled corporations in foreign 
 
27 Golumbic & Adams, supra note 20, at 9.  
28 See Milton S. Gwirtzman, Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 19 (describing how the market economy in Asia and Africa is governed by “oligarchic 
arrangements of social connections, family relations and reciprocal obligations”).  
29 See CQ PRESS, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 1160 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing nepotism on Capitol 
Hill). 
30 See Koehler, supra note 16, at 1010-11 (“Foreign governments are becoming increasingly 
involved in the production, distribution and acquisition of goods and services . . . . This 
involvement increases the opportunities and incentives to induce governmental conduct (by 
bribery and other techniques) in the service of private anticompetitive purposes.” (quoting 
American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 18, at 87 (statement of Donald I. Baker, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice))); see also id. at 1011 
(indicating that a major problem in foreign markets was the rise of “[g]overnment-controlled 
businesses run in many cases by officials” (quoting Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 63 (1976) (statement of Ian MacGregor, 
Chairman, AMAX Inc.))). 
31 See H.R. 15149, 94th Cong. § 2(h)(3) (1976) (defining “foreign government” to include “a 
corporation or other legal entity established or owned by, and subject to control by, a foreign 
government”); S. 3741, 94th Cong. § 2(h)(3) (1976) (same).  
32 See Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 16, at 216 (reflecting concerns of an ABA 
committee). 
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countries—much less to the relatives of executives at government-controlled 
entities. 
2. Congress Limited the Scope of the FCPA 
In passing the FCPA, Congress aimed to regulate several aspects of 
corporate bribery in foreign markets, including public corruption and 
inefficient business conditions. The 1977 House report accompanying the 
FCPA stated:  
The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign officials, 
foreign political parties or candidates for foreign political office is unethical. 
It is counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public. 
But not only is it unethical, it is bad business as well. It erodes public 
confidence in the integrity of the free market system. It short-circuits the 
marketplace by directing business to those companies too inefficient to 
compete in terms of price, quality or service, or too lazy to engage in honest 
salesmanship, or too intent upon unloading marginal products. In short, it 
rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical 
enterprises to lower their standards or risk losing business.33 
As the language of the House report shows, Congress believed bribery 
results in political, economic, and moral costs, and it enacted the FCPA to 
eliminate these costs. Despite the sweeping language of the House report, 
however, the legislative record shows that “the FCPA was intended to be a 
limited statute.”34 For example, even though Congress intentionally chose 
to prohibit exchanges involving “anything of value,” rather than just 
financial payments, members of Congress heard that some exchanges, such 
as charitable donations or tips, were often “normal and accepted” practices 
in foreign countries, and should not be automatically subject to criminal 
sanctions.35 In a 1975 hearing, Senator Frank Church, one of the Act’s 
primary proponents, suggested that the motivation for the then-pending 
FCPA legislation was not to eliminate all corruption but rather to target the 
“massive and widespread perversion of the free enterprise system,” such as 
the “arms industry campaign to flood the Middle East with weapons.”36 
 
33 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977).  
34 See Koehler, supra note 16, at 1003.  
35 See American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 18, at 6 (statement of Michael F. 
Butler, Vice President and General Counsel, Overseas Private Investment Corporation).  
36 Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad: Hearing on S. Res. 265 Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the S. Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong. 7 (1975) [hereinafter Protecting the 
Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad] (statement of Sen. Frank Church). 
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Similarly, in the Senate report that later served as the basis for the FCPA, 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs acknowledged that 
the FCPA “would not reach all corrupt overseas payments” but ensured that 
the FCPA applied to payments made “to influence legislation or regulations 
of the Government.”37 The legislative history shows that the purpose of the 
statute was to prevent public corruption, not to prohibit any type of 
exchange that could potentially influence activities overseas.38  
Congress passed the FCPA in 1977, regulating domestic business 
transactions with foreign officials overseas. Its passage was “almost 
immediately met with criticism.”39 In particular, opponents of the Act 
disagreed with its emphasis on criminalization.40 These critics favored a 
more disclosure-oriented strategy, which resisted governmental interference 
in foreign business negotiations.41 The Chairman of the SEC during this 
period publicly announced his reluctance to regulate particular forms of 
foreign payments, noting instead that the agency preferred to use disclosure 
laws as the primary deterrent to bribery overseas.42 The State Department 
also expressed concerns regarding the foreign policy ramifications of 
unilaterally enforcing legislation that regulated business relations between 
U.S. entities and foreign officials.43 Despite this criticism, Congress still 
passed the Act, including its criminal penalties. 
 
37 See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10-11 (1977).  
38 MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 117-18 (2014) 
(“The legislative history . . . makes clear that in passing the FCPA Congress intended to capture 
only a narrow category of payments . . . .”). 
39  Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law Against Foreign 
Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International Lawyer, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006). 
40 Koehler, supra note 16, at 1002 (describing the “vocal minority opposition to a direct 
criminal payment provision”).  
41 Id. at 994 (highlighting the finding by the Task Force on Questionable Corporate 
Payments Abroad that a disclosure regime would be an effective deterrent while an outright 
criminal prohibition would be difficult to enforce); see also Mike Koehler, Hail to the Chief, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/hail-to-the-chief-3, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ASB3-9482 (“The great debate at this time was whether the foreign payments 
problem should be addressed through a disclosure regime or through a criminalization regime.”). 
42 See Koehler, supra note 16, at 962-63 (“Under present law, if it is material, we cause its 
disclosure, and we need not get into the finer points of whether it is or is not legal.” (quoting 
Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 16, at 25 (statement of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, U.S. 
SEC))).  
43 Id. at 964-67.  
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3. Amendments to the Act 
Despite its controversial start, Congress has expanded the FCPA over 
the last few decades. In 1988, Congress amended the Act to incorporate two 
affirmative defenses: (1) the “lawful” payment defense and (2) the 
“reasonable and bona fide expenditure” defense.44 The “lawful” payment 
affirmative defense authorizes payment or conduct that is legal in the 
target’s country.45 The “reasonable and bona fide expenditure” defense 
permits miscellaneous expenses, such as travel, directly related to “the 
promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services” or “the 
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or 
agency.”46  
Ten years later, Congress amended the FCPA again to (1) include 
payments designed to secure “any improper advantage,” (2) cover foreign 
nationals who engaged in actions that furthered a bribery transaction while 
located in the United States, (3) expand the definition of “foreign official” 
to include public international organizations, (4) expand jurisdiction on the 
basis of nationality, and (5) enforce criminal penalties against foreign agents 
of U.S. corporations. 47  These amendments significantly broadened the 
scope of the FCPA, particularly regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction.48 
Finally, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 200249 further widened the FCPA’s 
reach by imposing several compliance, monitoring, and management 
obligations on issuers.50 These amendments show the growing number of 
 
44 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(a), 102 
Stat. 1415, 1415-19 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012)).  
45 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2012). 
46 Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2). 
47 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)). Many of these amendments were 
designed to conform to the requirements of the 1988 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, an 
international treaty that required parties to ban bribery in international commercial transactions. 
See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2-3 (1998); CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
ENFORCEMENT DIV., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4, 7 (2012) [hereinafter DOJ & SEC RESOURCE GUIDE], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf.  
48 Cf., e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(i) (2012). The U.S. government has repeatedly stated that 
parties may be subject to FCPA investigations if they “plac[e] a telephone call or send[] an e-mail, 
text message, or fax from, to, or through the United States” or “send[] a wire transfer from or to a 
U.S. bank or otherwise us[e] the U.S. banking system.” DOJ & SEC RESOURCE GUIDE, supra 
note 47, at 11. 
49 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012)) 
(requiring corporate officers to make certifications about corporate compliance and governance). 
50 Cf. Laura E. Kress, Note, How the Sarbanes–Oxley Act Has Knocked the “SOX” off the DOJ 
and SEC and Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, PITTSBURGH J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2009, art. 2, at 12-
15 (attributing the recent surge in FCPA enforcement to the enactment of Sarbanes–Oxley).  
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enforcement possibilities under the FCPA, a remarkable trend considering 
historical resistance to the Act’s intervention in foreign business 
transactions.  
B. Statutory Analysis 
DOJ and the SEC share the enforcement obligations under the Act.51 
DOJ has criminal FCPA enforcement authority over public companies 
(“issuers”), while the SEC has civil enforcement authority.52 DOJ also has 
both criminal and civil enforcement authority over “domestic concerns.”53 
The FCPA addresses two key aspects of foreign transactions. The first 
aspect involves the Act’s antibribery provision,54 while the second focuses 
on accounting procedures.55 This Comment will only focus on the FCPA’s 
antibribery provision because only this provision has been used to authorize 
relationship hire investigations. The following subsection will summarize 
some of the key elements of the antibribery provision.56  
1. Parties Subject to the FCPA 
Codified in section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,57 the 
antibribery provision makes it unlawful for certain individuals and 
businesses to “offer, pay[], promise to pay or authoriz[e] . . . the payment 
of . . . money . . . or . . . anything of value to . . . any foreign official for 
purposes of . . . influencing any act or decision of [the] foreign official in 
his official capacity . . . or . . . securing any improper advantage.”58 On the 
supply side of the illegal transactions—the “payer” of the bribe—this 
provision applies to (1) “issuers”59 and their officers, directors, employees, 
 
51 Both agencies collaborate with a number of other federal and international agencies to 
investigate FCPA violations. See DOJ & SEC RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 4-8.  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 4.  
54 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2012). 
55 See id.§ 78m(b)(2)(A) (requiring maintenance of accurate and truthful books and records). 
56 The antibribery provision is multifaceted. This subsection does not offer an exhaustive 
analysis of the provision, but rather introduces some key parts that provide the context for and 
address the purpose of the Act. 
57 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
58 Id. § 78dd-1(a).  
59 A company is an “issuer” under the FCPA if it has a class of securities registered under 
section 12 of the Exchange Act or is subject to the SEC’s reporting requirements under section 
15(d) of the Exchange Act. Effectively, this definition encompasses any company with securities 
listed on a national securities exchange in the United States or any company with securities listed 
in the over-the-counter market in the United States that files periodic reports with the SEC. See 
id.; see also DOJ & SEC RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 10.  
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agents, and shareholders; (2) “domestic concerns” 60  and their officers, 
directors, employees, agents, and shareholders; and (3) certain persons and 
entities, other than issuers and domestic concerns, acting while in the 
territory of the United States.61 On the recipient side—the “receiver” of the 
bribe—the provision is limited to a “foreign official,” which the Act defines 
as  
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, 
or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any 
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government 
or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such 
public international organization.62  
2. The “Business Purpose” Test 
The FCPA’s scope is limited to transactions or payments that assist in 
“obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any 
person.” 63  This requirement, known as the “business purpose test,” is 
broadly interpreted to encompass all payments (or analogous exchanges) 
made to secure business advantages, including favorable tax treatment, 
regulation, or licensing requirements.64  
 
60  These “domestic concerns” encompass American nationals and residents, American 
businesses, and foreign agents that act to promote FCPA violations while they are in the United 
States. The SEC maintains civil enforcement authority over issuers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) 
(2012); see also DOJ & SEC RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 11.  
61 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2012); see also DOJ & SEC RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 47, at 11. 
62 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(1)(A) (2012). This broad definition has been subject to criticism 
because it does not recognize distinctions between different categories of officials, such as low-
level employees, honorary officials, or employees of state-controlled entities. See, e.g., Golumbic & 
Adams, supra note 20, at 47 (identifying some of the problematic implications of applying the “foreign 
official” definition to companies in which sovereign wealth funds have a minority interest); Lisa A. 
Rickard, The Ambiguous FCPA: In Need of Updates and Clarifications, TOWNHALL (May 5, 2011), 
http://townhall.com/columnists/lisaarickard/2011/05/05/the_ambiguous_fcpa_in_need_of_updates_
and_clarifications/page/full, archived at http://perma.cc/M36H-ASTG (criticizing the FCPA’s 
failure to clarify the meaning of a foreign official and to explain whether individuals in state-
owned entities qualify as foreign officials). 
63 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2012). 
64 See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 756 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that payments 
made to Haitian government officials to reduce a corporation’s taxes could satisfy the business 
purpose test); see also, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight 
Forwarding Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov. 4, 2010), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm (announcing SEC allegations that “companies 
bribed customs officials in more than 10 countries in exchange for such perks as avoiding 
applicable customs duties on imported goods, expediting the importation of goods and equipment, 
extending drilling contracts, and lowering tax assessments”).  
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3. “Corrupt” State of Mind  
To be liable under the FCPA, the business or individual responsible for 
engaging in the transaction must possess a sufficiently culpable state of 
mind.65 Specifically, the offer, promise, or authorization of payment must 
be made “corruptly.”66 The Act does not define the term “corruptly,” 
although the legislative history of the statute indicates that this term refers 
to the “intent or desire wrongfully to influence the recipient.”67  
In addition, individual defendants must act “willfully” to be criminally 
liable under the FCPA.68 While the term “willful” is subject to varying 
interpretations, several circuit courts have held that defendants prosecuted 
under the FCPA “must act with a bad” or “unlawful” purpose to be found 
criminally liable.69  
4. “Anything of Value” 
The FCPA prohibits individuals and businesses from offering or 
authorizing the exchange of “anything of value” with foreign public officials 
for business advantages. 70  In adopting the term “anything of value,” 
Congress aimed to regulate many forms of bribery, not just cash 
transactions.71 Congress, however, was aware that “[t]he definition of a 
bribe . . . differ[s] from country to country,” and transactions that are 
permissible and commonplace in one nation could be deemed illegal in 
 
65 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2012). 
66 See supra note 65. 
67 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977). It appears that Congress intended the definition of 
“corruptly” in the FCPA to align with the definition in the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b), where “the word ‘corruptly’ indicates an intent or desire wrongfully to influence the 
recipient.” Id.  
68 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), 78dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
69 See United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 451 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[C]riminal willfulness 
requires only that criminal defendants have knowledge that they are acting unlawfully or 
‘knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense . . . .’”); see also DOJ & SEC RESOURCE 
GUIDE, supra note 47, at 14 (“The term ‘willfully’ is not defined in the FCPA, but it has generally 
been construed by courts to connote an act committed voluntarily and purposefully, and with a 
bad purpose . . . .”). 
70 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012). 
71 See id.; see also American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 18, at 6 (statement of 
Michael F. Butler, Vice President and General Counsel, Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation) (highlighting the blurry line between bribery and “tips, commissions, consulting 
fees, campaign contributions, [or] contributions for charitable projects favored by important 
foreign officials”).  
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another. 72  In a Senate hearing, U.S. Treasury Secretary W. Michael 
Blumenthal emphasized: 
In some countries, for example, it is proper and acceptable, as it clearly 
would not be in our country, for a government official also to be engaged in 
some business enterprise. However, what might be considered a legal 
transaction with that official in his country could be construed as a bribe, an 
illegal payment here. That’s why the question of how we define it is so 
important. In that country a transaction may be perfectly proper, but then 
the moment an American is accused here of paying a bribe to such an 
individual under our definition, an aspersion is cast immediately on him.73 
Evidently, Congress did not intend for the term “anything of value” to 
encompass every type of exchange between a U.S. business and a foreign 
public official, because it recognized that perceptions of these exchanges 
varied substantially by country. The legislative history on this particular 
phrase, however, is sparse, and it is difficult to identify what limits 
Congress intended when adopting the language.  
Federal agencies have generally relied on a broad interpretation of 
“anything of value,” using the term to justify the criminalization of a variety 
of foreign corporate transactions, including gifts,74 travel arrangements,75 and 
charitable contributions. 76  DOJ has also issued a number of opinions 
offering guidance on how to define the term,77 but none of these opinions 
 
72 Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing on S. 305 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 97-98 (1977) (statement of W. 
Michael Blumenthal, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury). 
73 Id. 
74 See, e.g., Complaint at 8-9, SEC v. RAE Sys. Inc., No. 10-2093 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2010), 
ECF No. 1 (alleging that the defendant corporation made unlawful cash payments to Chinese 
government officials); Complaint at 9-10, SEC v. ABB LTD, No. 04-1141 (D.D.C. July 6, 2004), 
ECF No. 1 (alleging that defendant corporation made illicit payments to foreign government 
officials). 
75 See Complaint at 13-14, SEC v. Lucent Techs. Inc., No. 07-2301 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2007), 
ECF No. 1 (alleging that defendant corporation provided over $10 million to Chinese officials so 
that these officials could visit the United States as tourists). 
76 See Complaint at 5, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 04-945 (D.D.C. June 9, 2004), 
ECF No. 1 (alleging that defendant corporation made payments to a Polish charity whose 
president was a government official).  
77 DOJ’s Opinion Release Index contains a series of opinions that offer guidance on how to 
interpret FCPA language, particularly the “anything of value” provision. See generally U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV., FRAUD SECTION, Index to Releases, http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/fraud/fcpa/index/ (last visited on Apr. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PV58-NEGA. 
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attempt to establish a substantive standard. 78  The absence of this 
information, coupled with the fact that very few courts have grappled with 
this language, has hindered the development of a clear governing standard. 
Consequently, many individuals and businesses subject to the FCPA’s 
jurisdiction remain unsure of what types of transactions could be considered 
bribes.79 Meanwhile, DOJ and the SEC are able to revise frequently their 
understanding of the term and use its ambiguity to broaden the scope of 
enforcement.  
C. Recent Trends in FCPA Enforcement 
1. Number of Enforcement Actions 
FCPA enforcement has evolved dramatically since the law was enacted 
in 1977. Despite the publicity surrounding Watergate and the corporate 
bribery scandals of the 1970s, the Act was widely considered a “dormant” 
regulation for many years after it was enacted.80 In fact, in the first three 
decades after its passage, federal agencies made little concerted effort to 
enforce any of its provisions.81 From the late 1970s to 2001, DOJ pursued at 
most five FCPA enforcement actions each year—reporting zero FCPA 
actions some years.82 The SEC also averaged only a few FCPA actions per 
year. 83  These numbers bear little resemblance to the state of FCPA 
enforcement today.84 Now, at any given moment, federal agencies are 
 
78 See Mike Koehler, Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance, 7 White Collar Rep. 
(BNA) 961, 961 (Dec. 14, 2012) (arguing that the FCPA guidance serves better as an “advocacy 
piece” for DOJ than a substantive interpretation of the Act’s provisions).  
79 See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Business Slams Bribery Act, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2011, at B1 
(reporting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and some FCPA lawyers “say there is still 
confusion over what is legal and what isn’t”); see also Shawn M. Wright & Henry F. Schuelke III, 
DOJ Casts Considerable Confusion Over Key Aspects of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Even As It 
Prepares to Publish Official FCPA Guidance, FOR THE DEFENSE (Blank Rome LLP, Washington, 
D.C.), Sept. 2012, at 1-2 (expressing concerns that there is a lack of “meaningful clarity over key 
aspects of the FCPA”).  
80 Dionne Searcey, U.S. Cracks Down on Corporate Bribes, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2009, at A1. 
81 See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 12 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 103 (2010) (“During the first quarter century of the FCPA’s history, 
enforcement of the law appears to have been minimal, at best.”). 
82 See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Economics of Foreign 
Bribery: Evidence from FCPA Enforcement Actions 42 fig.1 (Mar. 21, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573222.  
83  See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Apr. 24, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M9FM-TQ44. 
84 See Bixby, supra note 81, at 104 (“In the current post-Enron, Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) 
era, the SEC and the DOJ have dramatically increased civil and criminal enforcement of the 
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reportedly investigating over one hundred FCPA-related actions.85 In the 
last six years alone, the SEC has pursued an average of eleven FCPA 
enforcement actions per year,86 while DOJ brought more than twenty 
FCPA enforcement actions last year alone.87 Both agencies have created 
FCPA units within their enforcement divisions and have publicly identified 
FCPA enforcement as a top priority.88  
2. Aggressive Investigative Tactics 
The U.S. government has also started relying on increasingly more 
aggressive methods to enforce provisions of the Act. While investigations in 
the early 2000s were limited to reviewing companies’ books and records, 
DOJ and the SEC now frequently conduct industry-wide sweeps and 
undercover stings to identify FCPA violations. In 2010, DOJ announced it 
had arrested twenty-two executives in the military and law enforcement–
supply industries for FCPA violations after conducting an extensive 
undercover operation. 89  According to the indictments, undercover FBI 
agents posing as representatives of a public official in an African country 
persuaded the executives to make a “commission” payment to the official in 
exchange for contracts to sell weapons in the country. 90  The arrests 
highlighted a new era of enforcement and demonstrated DOJ’s willingness 
to “aggressively ramp[] up its proactive investigation and prosecution” of 
FCPA violators.91  
 
FCPA, compared with the previous twenty-five years.”); see also Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. 
LITIG. 439, 450 (2010) (describing the increase in FCPA enforcement actions as “exponential”).  
85  See Cross-Border Enforcement Trends, CROSS-BORDER INVESTIGATIONS UPDATE 
(Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2014, at 4. 
86 See SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 83. 
87 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5. DOJ maintains a list of all of its FCPA 
enforcement actions from 1977 to 2014. See id. 
88 See e.g., Carolina Bolado, FCPA Enforcement Won’t Slow Anytime Soon, DOJ Says, LAW 360 
(Mar. 6, 2014, 7:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/515865/fcpa-enforcement-won-t-slow-
anytime-soon-doj-says, archived at http://perma.cc/W2NK-NRVV (reporting that Patrick Stokes, 
chief of DOJ’s FCPA unit, indicated that the “the agency intended to speed up its investigations” 
in 2014); see also, e.g., SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 83 (highlighting the work of the SEC’s 
FCPA unit).  
89 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of 
Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme ( Jan. 
19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-crm-048.html.  
90 Id. 
91 See Howard W. Goldstein et al., Undercover DOJ Sting Operations for FCPA Violations: A 
New Level of Enforcement, MEMORANDUM TO OUR FRIENDS & CLIENTS (Fried, Frank, Harris, 
Shriver & Jacobson LLP, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 21, 2010, at 1-2. 
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In line with this new era of enforcement, the government has also 
started conducting industry-wide sweeps. Over the last five years, federal 
agencies have targeted multiple corporations in the oil services, tobacco, and 
telecommunications industries.92 In a typical sweep, DOJ or the SEC will 
identify suspected misconduct that may reflect an industry pattern.93 The 
government will investigate the conduct in one corporation, before 
broadening the scope of investigation to other companies in the same 
industry.94  The expansion is justified on the theory that “competitors 
operating in the same country likely were engaging in similar 
misconduct.”95  
Industry-wide sweeps have proven to be a successful enforcement 
technique for the government. For example, in 2013, DOJ and the SEC 
collected tens of millions of dollars in fines and disgorgement fees from 
agribusinesses after conducting a sweep of the industry.96 Similarly, in 2010, 
DOJ and the SEC reached settlements with six global oil and oil services 
companies, each of which paid between $6 million and $80 million in 
penalties, following an industry sweep.97 Based on recent news reports, it 
appears likely that DOJ and the SEC are currently using an industry-sweep 
method as they conduct investigations into corporate hiring practices 
overseas.98  
3. Severity of Penalties and Sanctions 
Along with increasing enforcement, federal agencies have intensified the 
severity of penalties and costs associated with FCPA violations. Fines for 
FCPA violations increased from $0 in 2000 to $1 billion in 2010.99 According 
 
92 See, e.g., 2010 Year-End FCPA Update (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, 
Cal.), Jan. 3, 2011, at 3-15 (describing federal industry-wide FCPA sweeps).  
93 Id. at 3-4 (summarizing the steps of a typical sweep).  
94 Id. at 4.  
95 Id.  
96 2013 Year-End FCPA Update (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, Cal.), Jan. 6, 
2014, at 6-8 (detailing the outcomes of DOJ and the SEC’s joint enforcement action against 
multinational agribusiness firms).  
97 See 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 92, at 3-7 (setting out DOJ and the SEC’s key 
allegations and terms of settlement).  
98 See Curran & Eaglesham, supra note 11 (“U.S. regulators have expanded their investigation 
into large banks’ hiring practices in Asia, seeking more information from at least five U.S. and 
European firms . . . .”); cf. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited May 11, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/68PG-WXL6 (showing the low level of FCPA enforcement in 2000).  
99 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Secures More Than $2 
Billion in Judgments and Settlements as a Result of Enforcement Actions Led by the Criminal 
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to a recent analysis, the average amount of an FCPA sanction is 
approximately $33.8 million,100 and the average corporate penalty is around 
$74 million.101 Corporations charged with FCPA violations will typically 
incur both criminal and civil liability, which makes the penalties even more 
striking. A recent report indicated that the average closing price for an 
FCPA action, including DOJ and SEC fines, penalties, disgorgement, and 
interest, was more than $80 million in 2013, “a nearly fourfold increase over 
2012.”102 Corporations such as Siemens AG, KBR/Halliburton, and BAE 
Systems have paid approximately $800 million, $600 million, and $400 
million, respectively, in recent FCPA resolutions.103 These contrast with 
FCPA resolutions in earlier years, “where it was common for multiple cases 
in any given year to settle south of $1 million—even in years where the 
average settlement value was slightly higher than the $80 million of 2013.”104  
4. Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
Finally, one of the most prominent enforcement trends is the rapid rise 
of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements in FCPA 
resolutions. With these arrangements, the government usually agrees to 
drop charges against FCPA defendants if they comply with certain 
governmental requests, which can range from ending a particular activity to 
creating a compliance program.105 Since 2000, DOJ has entered into at least 
twenty of these agreements every year, twice reaching its “high-water mark 
of thirty-nine agreements—in 2007 and 2010.”106 In 2013, nearly all of DOJ’s 
FCPA actions concluded in either a non-prosecution agreement or deferred 
prosecution agreement.107  
 
Division ( Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-secures-
more-2-billion-judgments-and-settlements-result-enforcement. 
100  See, e.g., SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS AND 
PATTERNS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/FCPA/FCPADigestTrendsandPatte 
rnsJan2012.pdf (listing the costs and penalties for FCPA violations in 2012).  
101 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Activity: 2013 Year in Review and 2014 
Preview, ROPES & GRAY ALERT (Ropes & Gray LLP, Boston, Mass.), Mar. 28, 2014, at 2.  
102 See 2013 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 96, at 3.  
103 Id. at 4. 
104 Id. 
105 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL ch. 9-16.325 (2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/16mcrm.htm#9-16.325.  
106 2013 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAS) and Non-
Prosecution Agreements (NPAS) (Gibson, Dunn & Cructcher LLP, Los Angeles, Cal.), July 9, 2013, 
at 1 [hereinafter 2013 Mid-Year Update]. 
107 See Mike Koehler, DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA—Year In Review, FCPA PROFESSOR ( Jan. 
8, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-4, archived at 
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The efficiency and merits of these agreements are subject to debate. 
Some FCPA scholars have applauded the government’s use of these 
agreements because “they can bring certainty to the conclusion of an 
enforcement action and allow [a would-be defendant] to make remedial 
changes and move forward.”108 These agreements, however, also allow the 
government to monopolize the terms of enforcement. And corporations 
accused of questionable FCPA violations may be more likely to settle for 
deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements to reduce 
litigation costs and risks.109 There are also few uniform legal standards 
guiding the consistent application of these agreements.110 Consequently, the 
terms of a deferred or non-prosecution agreement may depend entirely on 
particular prosecutors rather than standardized guidelines, which 
complicates any judicial effort to evaluate the legality of a particular 
agreement.  
II. “RELATIONSHIP HIRE” INVESTIGATIONS: THE NEW FRONTIER  
OF FCPA ENFORCEMENT 
The FCPA’s controversial legacy continues to evolve. Most recently, the 
statute was the subject of considerable media attention because of the SEC’s 
decision to investigate the hiring practices of several global banks, including 
 
http://perma.cc/6L3F-C2VQ; see also 2013 Mid-Year Update, supra note 106, at 1 (noting that 
deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements “continue to be a consistent 
vehicle for prosecutors and companies alike in resolving allegations of corporate wrongdoing”). 
108 Thomas R. Fox, The Destruction of Arthur Andersen and the Use of DPAs in FCPA Enforcement, 
FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Mar. 21, 2014, 8:34 AM), https://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/ 
2014/03/21/the-destruction-of-arthur-andersen-and-the-use-of-dpas-in-fcpa-enforcement, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7KFW-48Gx.  
109 See Joel Androphy, Ashley Gargour & Kathryn E. Nelson, The Intersection of the Dodd–
Frank Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: What All Practitioners, Whistleblowers, Defendants, and 
Corporations Need to Know, ADVOC. (Tex.), Summer 2012, at 19, 22 (Westlaw) (“Rather than 
endure a lengthy, expensive trial and potentially suffer harm to their business and goodwill, many 
companies prefer to enter plea agreements, DPAs, and NPAs.”). Recent trends, however, indicate 
that DOJ is now permitting corporations to set the terms of deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements. Just recently, in the SEC’s agreement with Stryker, the company was able to 
“negotiate language specifically and affirmatively denying any wrongdoing.” Peter Spivack & Sujit 
Raman, Essay, Regulating the “New Regulators”: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 178 (2008).  
110 See F. Joseph Warin & Peter E. Jaffe, The Deferred-Prosecution Jigsaw Puzzle: A Modest 
Proposal for Reform, 19 Andrews Litig. Rep. (West), No. 12, at 2-3 (Sept. 2005) (arguing that “the 
exercise of substantial individual discretion by federal prosecutors is undesirable in complex 
corporate investigations” and could be improved by creating uniform guidelines for these 
agreements).  
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Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and JPMorgan.111 These investigations 
have given rise to the “relationship hire” issue, which addresses whether the 
FCPA’s antibribery provision encompasses hiring individuals connected 
with foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or securing business 
overseas.  
Based on recent investigations, it is clear that federal agencies are 
particularly interested in reviewing corporate decisions to hire children or 
other close relatives of foreign officials in overseas branches.112 This move 
has sparked controversy in several places, such as China, where the practice 
of hiring well-connected children is commonplace.113 Until recently, banks 
in this region routinely engaged in “elephant hunting”—“a term used to 
describe the chasing of mandates to manage the multi-billion dollar stock 
offerings of the country’s big state-owned enterprises.” 114  The recent 
investigations have cast doubt on whether this practice is legal under the 
FCPA.  
A. JPMorgan’s “Sons and Daughters Program” Scandal 
To date, the most well-known example of the relationship hire issue is 
DOJ and the SEC’s probe into JPMorgan’s hiring practices in China. In 
2006, JPMorgan launched a hiring program in China called “Sons and 
Daughters,” which separated the employment applications of “well-
 
111 See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Tracked Business Linked to China 
Hiring, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2013, 1:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/07/bank-
tabulated-business-linked-to-china-hiring, archived at http://perma.cc/V9NC-NL6B. 
112 See Hiring a Problem: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Employing Relatives of Government Officials, 
BUS. ETHICS & ANTI-CORRUPTION (Norton Rose Fulbright, London), Feb. 2014, at 1 
(“[R]ecent investigations by US enforcement authorities . . . have increased the focus on hiring 
relatives of government officials, which the US authorities may consider to be an attempt to 
provide improper benefits to government officials.”).  
113 Hiring of college-educated children of prominent politicians and business leaders in 
China is so pervasive that a special term—“princelings”—exists that refers to these children. See, 
e.g., David Barboza & Sharon LaFraniere, China “Princelings” Using Family Ties to Gain Riches, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2012, at A1 (describing the elite Chinese youth as “princelings” who frequently 
“serve as middlemen to a host of global companies and wealthy tycoons eager to do business in 
China”); Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, On Defensive, Bank Hired China’s Elite, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30 2013, at A1 [hereinafter Protess & Silver-Greenberg, Bank Hired China’s Elite] 
(“The hiring became so widespread over the last two decades that banks competed over the most 
politically connected recent college graduates, known in China as princelings.”). 
114 See JPMorgan Hit by U.S. Bribery Probe into Chinese Hiring: Report, REUTERS, Aug. 18, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/18/us-jpmorgan-investigation-china-idUS 
BRE97H00P20130818; see also David Barboza, Many Wall St. Banks Woo Children of Chinese 
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 21, 2013, at B1 (characterizing Wall Street banks’ hiring of the sons and 
daughters of senior Chinese government officials as “no secret”).  
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connected candidates” from those of ordinary candidates.115 The original 
purpose of this separation, and the program at large, was to heighten review 
of applications from well-connected candidates to ensure that the bank’s 
hiring did not violate nepotism or bribery laws.116  
Despite the alleged purpose of the Sons and Daughters program, 
allegations emerged that the program in fact relaxed hiring standards for 
well-connected candidates and expedited their applications.117 News reports, 
for example, have suggested a link between Tang Xiaoning, a recently-hired 
JPMorgan employee and son of the chairman of the China Everbright 
Group, and JPMorgan’s role in Everbright’s initial public offering.118 The 
SEC soon began investigating the hire.119 By August 2013, the SEC had 
requested JPMorgan to produce “all documents” related to the bank’s 
decision to hire Tang Xiaoning.120 JPMorgan reportedly cooperated with 
the agency and disclosed documents with information on its hiring in 
China. 121  These documents included emails that linked employees to 
“potential business opportunities” in Chinese state-owned entities and 
revealed internal discussion on the strategic advantage of having 
government contacts at the firm.122 The bank also turned over several “track 
 
115 See Silver-Greenberg & Protess, China Elite, supra note 7. 
116 See id.  
117 See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank Tracked Business Linked to China Hiring, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2013, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Protess & Silver-Greenberg, Business Linked to 
China Hiring] (“[B]y 2009, the ‘Sons and Daughters’ program was putting the job candidates on 
the fast track to employment.”). Media reports on the investigation indicate that changes in the 
program’s effect on hiring occurred because JPMorgan management believed the program was 
preventing the bank from capturing lucrative business opportunities. See, e.g., Protess & Silver-
Greenberg, Bank Hired China’s Elite, supra note 113. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, multi-
billion dollar stock and debt offerings by Chinese state-owned enterprises provided important growth 
opportunities for global investment banks. See id. In emails, JPMorgan officials worried that the 
bank’s failure to capture some of this business was due to the lack of government connections with 
the bank’s China office. Id.; see also Minxin Pei, J.P. Morgan and the Pitfalls of Hiring China’s Elite 
Offspring, FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/08/19/j-p-morgan-and-the-
pitfalls-of-hiring-chinas-elite-offspring/, archived at http://perma.cc/R8TW-K6K7 (noting that firms 
like JPMorgan are “stuck between a rock and a hard place in China” because “[t]he country is run 
by a one-party regime that has created a hereditary political aristocracy well-versed in the art of 
turning power into personal profits”). 
118 See Silver-Greenberg & Protess, China Elite, supra note 7. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. The bank included a reference to the probe in its quarterly 10-Q filing submitted on 
August 7, 2013. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 11 (Aug. 7, 2013) 
(noting “[a] request from the SEC Division of Enforcement seeking information and documents 
relating to, among other matters, the Firm’s employment of certain former employees in Hong 
Kong and its business relationships with certain clients”).  
121 See Silver-Greenberg & Protess, China Elite, supra note 7; see also Silver-Greenberg & 
Protess, Business Linked to China Hiring, supra note 117.  
122 See Silver-Greenberg & Protess, Business Linked to China Hiring, supra note 117. 
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record” spreadsheets, which matched these hires to successful business 
deals.123  
Not surprisingly, these revelations helped broaden investigation into the 
bank’s hiring practices. According to news reports, federal investigators are 
examining JPMorgan’s decision to hire other politically connected 
individuals, such as Zhang Xixi, the daughter of a Chinese railway official.124 
Many of the individuals under scrutiny had advanced degrees in business 
and work experience in similar financial institutions, and no evidence 
appears to show conclusively that they were not qualified to work at the 
bank.125 Several bankers, however, noted that regardless of whether the 
individuals were qualified to be at JPMorgan, the presence of politically 
connected employees in China correlates with successful business in the 
region.126 Based on the information in the disclosed emails, JPMorgan 
officials were well aware of the importance of these connections.127  
The theory underlying DOJ and the SEC’s investigation is not limited 
to JPMorgan’s practice of hiring children of foreign officials. After all, 
employing relatives of foreign officials is not itself a violation of the law. 
Rather, at the core of the investigation is a search for evidence showing that 
JPMorgan offered jobs to relatives of Chinese officials in exchange for 
lucrative business deals in China. For example, the investigation relating to 
Zhang Xixi will presumably focus on the relations between JPMorgan and 
her father’s company, which hired the JPMorgan to advise on the 
company’s initial public offering shortly after Ms. Zhang joined the bank.128 
Similarly, the investigation relating to Tang Xiaoning will likely examine 
China Everbright Group’s decision to hire JPMorgan as its advisor, even 
 
123 Id. 
124 See Lawrence White & Michael Flaherty, JPMorgan China Probe Sends Chill Through 
Investment Banks, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/19/ 
china-jpmorgan-hiring-idUSL4N0GK1A520130819; see also Dan Fitzpatrick, Enda Curran & Justin 
Baer, Bank Emails Note Hire’s Family Tie, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2013, at C3.  
125  For example, Zhang Xixi reportedly attended Stanford University before joining 
JPMorgan. See Silver-Greenberg, Protess & Barboza, Hiring in China by JPMorgan, supra note 1.  
126 See Silver-Greenberg & Protess, China Elite, supra note 7.  
127 See id.; see also Protess & Silver-Greenberg, Bank Hired China’s Elite, supra note 113 
(reporting emails from JPMorgan managers showing company officials were aware of political 
connections of employees in the Hong Kong office, such as the “son of #2 at SinoTruk,” a state-
owned trucking venture).  
128 See Silver-Greenberg, Protess & Barboza, JPMorgan Under Scrutiny, supra note 1; Sue 
Chang, SEC Probes J.P. Morgan’s China Hiring Practice, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 18, 2013, 1:53 PM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-probes-jp-morgans-china-hiring-practice-2013-08-18, archived 
at http://perma.cc/XQT9-CAQP (“J.P. Morgan’s Hong Kong office . . . hired the daughter of a 
Chinese railway official while the state-controlled China Railway Group was in the process of 
picking the investment bank as an adviser for a planned initial public offering . . . .”). 
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though the company had relied on Morgan Stanley in previous years.129 In 
addition, the probe will likely examine JPMorgan’s decision to employ 
Fullmark Consultants, a consulting firm controlled by Wen Rachun, 
daughter of then-Premier Wen Jiabao, and whether the deal secured the 
bank special access to Chinese state-owned entities.130 
B. The Government’s Previous Relationship Hire Investigations  
The JPMorgan scandal reflects a notable shift in the government’s 
approach to relationship hire investigations. While the government has 
scrutinized hiring practices under the FCPA in the past, most of these 
investigations have focused on sham or “no-show” employment agreements. 
For example, in SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., the SEC accused UTStarcom of 
making at least ten full-time offers of employment to relatives of 
government officials in China and Thailand.131 The SEC claimed that these 
offers were intentionally made to secure improper business advantages in 
the region.132 Significantly, however, the SEC alleged that the employees in 
question did not actually perform work for the company, but received 
salaries and other employment-related benefits.133  
Similarly, in United States v. DaimlerChrysler China Ltd., federal 
prosecutors targeted DaimlerChrysler’s payments to the son of a prominent 
China National Petroleum Corporation official and the wife of a Sinopec 
Corporation official when neither was actually working for the company.134 
DaimlerChrysler’s records allegedly indicated that money paid to the wife 
of the Sinopec official resulted from a consulting agreement, but the wife 
never performed any services for the firm.135 The company’s payments to 
the son of the CNPC official were equally dubious. He received internships 
for himself and his girlfriend, a car, €30,000 for “market research,” student 
 
129 See Protess & Silver-Greenberg, Bank Hired China’s Elite, supra note 113 (“[S]ince the 
younger Mr. Tang was hired, China Everbright and its subsidiaries hired JPMorgan at least three 
times . . . .”). Later, though, JPMorgan walked away from a deal involving Everbright. See 
JPMorgan Withdraws from $2 Billion China Everbright Bank HK Listing: Source, REUTERS, Nov. 19, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/19/us-jpmorgan-everbright-idUSBRE9AI 
09620131119.  
130 See David Barboza, Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Bank’s Fruitful Ties to a 
Member of China’s Elite, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013, at A1. 
131 See Complaint at 4, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. 09-6094 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009), 
ECF No. 1. 
132 Id. at 6-7.  
133 Id. at 4. 
134 Complaint at 9-10, United States v. DaimlerChrysler China Ltd., No. 10-66 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 22, 2010), ECF No. 1. 
135 See id. at 10.  
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visa processing assistance, and a monthly salary.136 In these cases, the 
government alleged that the employment agreement at issue was a sham or 
“no show” arrangement, used to facilitate an illicit exchange between 
businesses and public officials.  
III. EXPANDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF RELATIONSHIP HIRES: 
LEGAL AND POLICY RAMIFICATIONS 
Relationship hires often present a gray area of bribery that does not 
align neatly with traditional FCPA enforcement. As discussed in the 
previous Part, an offer of employment to a relative of a public official can 
serve the same purpose as a traditional cash bribe. In many ways, there is no 
meaningful difference between making a sham employment agreement and 
providing a suitcase stuffed with cash. The government’s recent decision to 
target hiring practices in the absence of evidence of sham employment, 
however, is troubling. Indeed, several prominent FCPA scholars have 
already publicly decried the investigations as hypocritical,137 “aggressive,”138 
and “dicey.”139 
The federal investigation into hiring practices in the absence of evidence 
of a sham employment agreement suggests that relationship hires are a 
corrupt practice per se. This presumption relies on an interpretation of the 
Act that contradicts its legislative intent and purpose. In addition, there are 
compelling policy reasons not to target relationship hires when companies 
are offering bona fide employment. Criminalizing relationship hires will 
produce a chilling effect on business overseas, allow prosecutors to 
 
136 See id. 
137 See Robert Reich, JP Morgan Chase, the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, and the Corruption of 
America, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2013, 10:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/ 
jp-morgan-corrupt-practice-act_b_4410253.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3K4D-3P5Q (suggesting 
that the government’s focus on corruption in China is misplaced given the significant role of 
money in U.S. politics); see also Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 27, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-103, archived at http://perma.cc/HA72-5MMS 
(“[T]here is a double standard concerning corporate interaction with ‘foreign officials’ under the 
FCPA and corporate interaction with U.S. officials under other U.S. laws . . . .”); Jonathan Weil, 
What’s the Difference Between U.S., Chinese Corruption?, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Aug. 30, 2013, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-08-30/what-s-the-difference-between-u-s-chinese-
corruption-, archived at http://perma.cc/NF3H-QRQP (suggesting that the trend of hiring 
relatives of powerful people is also common in the United States).  
138 Cf. Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 984 (2010) 
(critiquing the government’s interpretations of the FCPA).  
139 Matt Levine, Sometimes JPMorgan Hired the Children of Its Clients, DEALBREAKER (Aug. 
19, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://dealbreaker.com/2013/08/sometimes-jpmorgan-hired-the-children-of-
its-clients, archived at http://perma.cc/HDH2-2SMD (highlighting the difficulty of distinguishing 
between different reasons for making a hire). 
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monopolize the theory of the Act’s application, and provoke international 
criticism contrary the Act’s goal of improving foreign relations.  
A. The Government’s Expansive Reading of the FCPA Contradicts  
Legislative Intent  
DOJ and the SEC have expanded probes into relationship hires by 
relying on the FCPA’s statutory language.140 In particular, the agencies 
emphasize the Act’s prohibition of the exchange of “anything of value” for 
improper business advantages.141 The language is broad, and it can be 
interpreted to include offers of employment. Employment offers are often 
inherently valuable and are tied to a number of additional benefits, 
including work visas, club memberships, reputational prestige, and 
networking opportunities. Domestic case law also supports the view that 
“future employment promised” to a defendant by a third party is a “thing of 
value” in the bribery context.142  
While the government’s interpretation of the statute certainly justifies 
its investigation into sham or “no show” employment agreements, it does 
not support broad investigations into all types of hiring practices. There 
was no evidence in the JPMorgan investigation that the firm’s employment 
contracts with the children of Chinese business leaders were sham 
agreements or that the children rendered no services for the firm. The 
government’s decision to pursue the investigation, notwithstanding, rests on 
an overly expansive understanding of the FCPA. Indeed, the expansive 
reading suggests that the FCPA may serve as a catch-all law, potentially 
authorizing a vast range of governmental investigations into corporations on 
the basis of corporate ethics.  
A fundamental problem with the government’s broad reading of the 
FCPA is that this reading contradicts the Act’s legislative history. As 
discussed in detail in Part I, the Act was intended to be a “limited 
statute.”143 Congress did not intend to criminalize all corrupt payments but 
rather to prohibit payments that facilitate public corruption, such as 
corporate gifts to corrupt foreign leaders.144 Investigations—which can be as 
 
140 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 134, at 9-12. 
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2012). 
142 United States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1305 (6th Cir. 1986). 
143 Koehler, supra note 16, at 1003.  
144 See supra Section I.A (discussing the Act’s legislative history); see also Protecting the Ability 
of the United States to Trade Abroad, supra note 36, at 7 (statement of Sen. Frank Church) 
(indicating that the architects of the FCPA were concerned about the “massive and widespread 
perversion of the free enterprise system”).  
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onerous as sanctions—into hiring practices that do not reflect sham 
agreements or widespread public corruption are inconsistent with 
Congress’s intent. The JPMorgan employees that are the target of the 
government’s investigation are not political figures, and most of them are 
not even related to government officials.  
In addition, the hearings devoted to the drafting of the Act show that 
Congress’s primary goal was to regulate corporate transactions with public 
officials or political leaders, not owners of state-owned enterprises or 
government-controlled businesses.145 Congress did not include these hybrid 
entities in the definition of a “foreign official,” even though legislators were 
aware of the presence and power of hybrid entities in foreign countries.146 
In the JPMorgan investigation, the government is targeting not only state-
owned enterprises, but also focusing its investigation on the children of 
state-owned enterprise managers. Given that Congress did not even 
mention family members in any of the legislative bills or hearings that 
served as the basis for the FCPA, and that Congress did not include 
regulation of state-owned enterprises, the current federal probes appear to 
be an impermissibly broad interpretation of the Act.  
This broad reading of the statute also fails to acknowledge the nuances 
of hiring practices in the FCPA context. In a sham employment agreement, 
the offer of employment is analogous to the offer of a financial bribe 
because it is obvious that the sole purpose of the offer is to influence the 
conduct of the receiving side. In the relationship-hire context, a company 
may choose to hire employees for a host of reasons in conjunction with, or 
irrespective of, their political affiliations.147 The statutory language of the 
FCPA presupposes a fairly straightforward exchange—an offer, a payment, 
or an authorization of “anything of value” in exchange for business.148 The 
relationship-hire context does not easily map onto the exchange 
contemplated by the statutory language because there are often several 
 
145 See supra Section I.A. 
146 See supra Section I.A. 
147 Some commentators have dismissed this critique. For example, a New York Times blog 
post defending the government’s reading of the FCPA recently suggested that the U.S. 
government “is unlikely to care much about a few questionable hires, even if those people were 
less qualified than other applicants.” Peter J. Henning, JPMorgan Case Tests U.S. Law on Buying 
Influence Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/jp-
morgan-case-tests-u-s-law-on-buying-influence-abroad/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y5G2-DDGV. Many of the relationship hire investigations, however, focus 
precisely on these “questionable hires.” Cf. id. Further, the government has not elaborated on 
distinctions based on a candidate’s qualifications or credentials, making it difficult to understand 
how the FCPA applies to these types of cases.  
148 Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2012). 
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explanations for an employment offer or hiring decision.149 In addition, the 
value of an employment offer is far more subjective where an employee 
actually offers valuable services in exchange for a paycheck. The quid-pro-
quo aspect of a relationship hire is more complex than in a sham 
employment agreement, in which it is clear that the recipient has no 
intention of performing any services.  
That the offer is extended to a relative also poses additional line-
drawing problems that the statute itself does not begin to address. For 
example, does it matter whether the hired relative of a foreign official 
retains his salary (or other benefits from employment) and does not transfer 
money to the official? Is there an assumption that the foreign official 
experiences some psychological benefit from securing employment for his 
son or daughter? Or does the benefit derive from the “elimination of an 
economic opportunity cost?”150  
DOJ’s response to these questions has only added to the confusion.151 In 
one FCPA review procedure release that is now over thirty years old, for 
example, DOJ indicated that the government would not pursue an 
enforcement action against a machinery company that employed a foreign 
official’s relative under a contract that provided sales commissions when the 
company obtained assurances from both the relative and the official that 
they would adhere to the FCPA.152 The employee–relative had been hired 
to sell a generator to a foreign government, and the employee’s brother was 
an employee of the foreign government.153 In its response, DOJ indicated 
that the hire was permissible under the FCPA when the employee’s 
contract in effect prohibited him from relaying any part of his commission 
 
149 While the employment offer must be made “corruptly” to create FCPA liability, the 
meaning of this term is not clearly defined in the statute, and case law has not shed much light on 
the bounds of this state-of-mind requirement.  
150  Michael Volkov, Focus on Hiring Relatives of Foreign Officials: A Serious Bribery Risk?, 
CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Sept. 22, 2013), http://corruptioncrimecompliance.com/ 
2013/09/focus-on-hiring-relatives-of-foreign-officials-a-serious-bribery-risk, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
KW88-N4SM.  
151 DOJ has published several advisory opinions in an attempt to offer guidance on the 
appropriate interpretation of the Act’s language. These include opinion procedure releases and 
review procedure releases. Both publications typically offer DOJ’s opinion on a question or 
hypothetical submitted by a party concerned that its actions might violate the FCPA. For 
example, if a corporation is concerned that its decision to hire a particular employee might lead to 
FCPA liability, it can ask DOJ to review the hiring decision in advance to ensure that it does not 
constitute a violation. DOJ makes the releases available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 
fraud/fcpa/. 
152 See DOJ FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 82-04 (Nov. 11, 1982). 
153 Id. 
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to his brother and when both the employee and his brother signed affidavits 
swearing to comply with the antibribery provisions of the FCPA.154  
Twenty-five years after issuing the opinion, DOJ appeared to take a 
different position. In 2007, DOJ obtained a nonprosecution agreement from 
Paradigm B.V., stemming in part from Paradigm’s decision to hire the 
brother of an official responsible for awarding contracts for Pemex, the 
Mexican state-owned oil company.155 DOJ penalized Paradigm for this 
hiring decision, even though apparently none of the brother’s earnings were 
shared with officials at Pemex. 156  These contrasting positions by DOJ 
underscore some of the ambiguous and contradictory implications of the 
Act’s language.  
B. Policy Arguments Against the Government’s Interpretation of the FCPA 
1. Chilling Effect on Business in Foreign Markets 
The government’s broad interpretation of the FCPA in the context of 
relationship hires is also troublesome from a policy perspective. Bribery is 
socially costly, but investigating the hiring practices of banks is unlikely to 
reduce public corruption substantially. The more likely outcome of hiring 
investigations is an adverse effect on U.S. business relations overseas, 
because the reality remains that in several countries, particularly China, 
relationship hires help U.S. corporations enter into and participate in the 
market.157 Given this reality, expanding FCPA probes into hiring practices 
 
154 Id. 
155 See Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Saul M. 
Pilchen, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP app. A (Sept. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/paradigm/09-21-07paradigm-agree.pdf (describing 
the arrangement); see also Richard L. Cassin, Paradigm’s Pre-IPO Due Diligence Reveals 
FCPA Violations, FCPA BLOG (Sept. 24, 2007, 7:05 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2007/9/ 
24/paradigms-pre-ipo-due-diligence-reveals-fcpa-violations.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
3UFC-7DWX (reporting the nonprosecution agreement). 
156 Cf. Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell to Saul M. Pilchen, supra note 155, app. A (describing 
the employment arrangement but not suggesting that the official received any portion of his 
brother’s salary). 
157  Some scholars have argued that even the most prudently constructed antibribery 
provisions may not reduce corruption in countries where bribery transactions represent routine 
ways of conducting business. See generally Steven R. Salbu, Colloquy, Extraterritorial Restriction of 
Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 223, 226 (1999) 
(“[A]ny form of extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation, even the most perfectly conceived, must 
be considered imprudent under the global conditions of the late twentieth century.”). Professor 
Salbu’s argument is built on the propositions that perceptions of bribery vary by culture and that 
U.S. law is incapable of transforming culturally constructed practices. See id. at 232 (“[V]arying 
attitudes . . . exist in regard to bribery and corruption across the globe.”); see also Steven R. 
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will likely have one of two effects. Companies may continue to rely on 
relationship hires but change how they track and report their hiring decisions 
to reduce FCPA scrutiny.158 Corporations may continue to cooperate with 
the government but rely on selective disclosure rather than frank 
dialogue. 159  Alternatively, companies may stop relying on these hires 
altogether and may be discouraged from investing in foreign markets. 
Indeed, some suggest that increased FCPA enforcement has had a chilling 
effect on U.S. corporations’ investments overseas. 160  Several empirical 
studies have produced findings to this effect.161 Investigating companies’ 
 
Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery, 33 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 657, 678 (2000) (“If corruption is firmly rooted in institutional foundations, fighting it 
by legal decree is naive.”).  
158 See Matt Levine, JPMorgan’s Mistake Was Not Hiring Chinese Princelings Fast Enough, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Dec. 30, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-12-
30/jpmorgan-s-mistake-was-not-hiring-chinese-princelings-fast-enough, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
P9CH-FVX9 (arguing that a lesson of the JPMorgan scandal is that “[t]he most effective 
compliance program of all might just be ‘do whatever you want but never say anything in 
writing’”).  
159 See id. The effect of this selective disclosure may be compounded because voluntary 
disclosures, in many cases, increase a corporation’s monitoring costs and do not yield any 
sentencing leniency. Cf. Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in 
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 338-39 (2012) (“[E]ven when 
companies do voluntarily disclose, a vast majority are nonetheless subjected to substantial 
sanctions.”).  
160 On February 21, 2012, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce published a letter that it sent 
along with thirty-three other business organizations to DOJ, arguing that the result of the FCPA’s 
current enforcement regime has “been a chilling effect on legitimate business activity (as 
companies perceive a real risk of prosecution even in scenarios involving only the most remote and 
attenuated connection to foreign governments) and a costly misallocation of compliance 
resources.” Letter from US Chamber of Commerce et al. to Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Robert Khuzami, Dir. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n 2 (Feb. 21, 2012); see also Paul J. Beck, Michael W. Maher & Adrian E. 
Tschoegl, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & 
DECISION ECON. 295, 300-01 (1991) (finding that the FCPA “has negatively affected exports to 
non-Latin American bribery countries”); Peter Jeydel, Comment, Yoking the Bull: How to Make the 
FCPA Work for U.S. Business, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 523, 527-29 (2012) (“It is th[e] noxious 
combination of extremely harsh penalties and an ambiguous set of rules that makes the FCPA so 
disruptive to commercial activity.”). 
161 See, e.g., Beck, Maher & Tschoegl, supra note 160, at 295 (discussing a survey of American 
diplomatic posts in which twenty-one claimed that the FCPA acted as an “export disincentive” in 
their countries); see also COMM. ON INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, THE FCPA 
AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS—SHOULD ANYTHING BE 
DONE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S.’S UNIQUE POSITION ON COMBATING 
OFFSHORE CORRUPTION? 23 (2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/ 
FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf (“[T]he current anti-bribery regime—
which tends to place disproportionate burdens on U.S. regulated companies in international 
transactions and incentivizes other countries to take a ‘lighter touch’—is causing lasting harm to 
the competitiveness of U.S. regulated companies and the U.S. capital markets . . . .”); Jon 
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hiring practices even when the practices do not appear to involve sham 
employment will only intensify this chilling effect, particularly in countries 
where relationship hires allow U.S. corporations to enter markets 
dominated by state-owned enterprises. 162  JPMorgan, for example, has 
reportedly walked away from multiple deals in China as a result of the 
investigation. 163  The FCPA’s chilling effect not only restricts market 
participation, but also places U.S. companies at a disadvantage with respect 
to their foreign competitors.164 Foreign businesses that lack a connection to 
the United States do not have to bear the costs of additional due diligence 
and FCPA scrutiny and can continue to rely on relationship hires without 
issue. These asymmetrical market opportunities limit the ability of 
American businesses to compete overseas. 
Furthermore, the FCPA’s chilling effect may have a greater impact on 
smaller businesses than on larger corporations. Larger corporations have the 
capacity to expand compliance systems, while smaller businesses may not be 
able to finance the due diligence needed to avoid FCPA scrutiny.165 Smaller 
entities may eventually benefit from a more transparent economy, but until 
then, smaller businesses may be deterred from expanding overseas.  
2. Risk of “Prosecutorial Common Law”  
A second major policy concern raised by DOJ and the SEC’s probe into 
relationship hires is the lack of judicial scrutiny over the government’s 
 
Moran, Bribery and Corruption: The OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, 8 BUS. ETHICS EUR. REV. 141, 142 (1999) (suggesting 
that the FCPA constrains American firms relative to foreign competitors). But see Wesley Cragg 
& William Woof, The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Study of Its Effectiveness, 107 BUS. & 
SOC’Y REV. 98, 99 (2002) (suggesting that the U.S. share of the export trade in corrupt countries 
may have increased despite the FCPA).  
162 See Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as 
Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 366 (2010) (arguing that the 
“FCPA, as enforced, operates as de facto economic sanctions against countries where substantial 
foreign direct investment is occurring and yet which have substantial levels of corruption”). 
163 See Prudence Ho, J.P. Morgan Exits from China IPOs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2014, at C3 
(reporting that JPMorgan has pulled out of various initial public offerings by Chinese companies, 
including China Everbright Bank, Tianhe Chemicals, and China CNR Corp.). 
164 Cf. Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Comment, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861, 868-69 (2001) (“The competitive 
disadvantage argument takes the position that bribery is a reality in many countries and that 
prohibitions against payments by United States companies abroad cause harm to American 
businesses.” (footnote omitted)). 
165 See Noam B. Fischman, FCPA Compliance Trends in an Era of Ambiguous Enforcement, in 
INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT (Aspatore 2014), available at 2014 WL 10499, 
at *6 (asserting that that small businesses, “unlike larger entities, . . . may not have the resources 
to design, implement, and police an anti-corruption program”).  
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interpretation of the FCPA. FCPA investigations tend to be settled early, 
so the government’s interpretation of the Act’s provisions is rarely 
scrutinized in a judicial setting. As a result, it remains unlikely that 
defendants, the vast majority of which are large corporations, will offer an 
alternative interpretation of the statute. Challenging the government’s 
interpretation would require a long, drawn-out, expensive proceeding. Most 
large corporations prefer to pay the costs of early resolution rather than risk 
litigation.166  
The absence of judicial oversight or pushback against DOJ and the 
SEC’s reading of the statute allows “prosecutorial common law” to govern 
the outcomes of FCPA disputes.167 The government has an “institutional 
interest in pushing ever more aggressive interpretations” of the FCPA, 
because it wants to develop the law to enforce it against other parties in the 
future. 168  Meanwhile, FCPA defendants are primarily concerned with 
disposing of the suit and have no interest in shaping the law for other 
defendants.169 Federal prosecutors thus possess the ability to “effectively 
control the disposition of the FCPA cases they initiate and impose their 
 
166 See Richard L. Cassin, A Gesture of Justice, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 9, 2010, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/2/10/a-gesture-of-justice.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
3UYU-PFBZ (“Not a single corporate defendant, big or small, has fought Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act charges in court for the past two decades . . . . Because respondeat superior leaves 
companies defenseless, their only choice when threatened with prosecution is to cop a plea. That 
gives the DOJ and other enforcement agencies enormous power to force settlements on their 
corporate targets.”). Corporations are also likely to invest considerable resources in their 
compliance programs without ever questioning the need for this compliance. See Miriam Hechler 
Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1036 (2008) (explaining that because the 
“corporate criminal liability standard is so broad and the collateral consequences of a criminal 
indictment are so devastating, entities will attempt to avoid formal charges ex ante by investing in 
‘compliance’ products intended to impress prosecutors in the future, even if these programs are 
more costly than effective”). The government has also strengthened incentives for FCPA 
defendants to cooperate and participate in voluntary, early reporting by claiming that disclosure 
could lead to lower fines and relaxed sentencing. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate 
Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1833 (2011) (attributing the increase in enforcement to voluntary 
self-reporting); Koehler, supra note 138, at 924-29 (arguing that self-reporting incentives propel 
enforcement); Irina Sivachenko, Note, Corporate Victims of “Victimless Crime”: How the FCPA’s 
Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages Compliance, 54 B.C. 
L. REV. 393, 413 (2013) (“Lacking concrete guidance from the DOJ, other than broad 
recommendations of ‘best practices,’ and judicial interpretation of the statute, the companies that 
are trying to follow the rules in good faith are forced to take unsubstantiated guesses as to what is 
proper.”); Emily Willborn, Note, Extraterritorial Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion in the 
FCPA: A Call for International Prosecutorial Factors, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 422, 433-34 (2013) (noting 
that “broad prosecutorial discretion has the potential to lead to prosecutorial abuse”). 
167  See Michael Levy, Prosecutorial Common Law, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/prosecutorial-common-law, archived at http://perma.cc/G2XK-WASC.  
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own extremely broad interpretation of the FCPA’s key provisions.”170 This 
state of circumstances may benefit the government and some FCPA 
defendants, but it also “erodes the ability of the judiciary to do its job and 
skews the balance of power in the criminal justice system heavily in favor of 
prosecutors and away from defendants and the courts.”171 It also allows the 
government to continue adopting “dubious,” “untested,” and ambiguous 
readings of the Act to develop new frontiers for enforcement, thereby 
undermining the purpose of the statute and the integrity of the judicial 
system.172  
3. Foreign Policy Ramifications 
Finally, applying the FCPA to relationship hires has foreign policy 
implications because it regulates practices in foreign countries using 
American standards. Ironically, a law originally passed to remedy negative 
international perceptions of American companies abroad 173  has now 
emerged as a source of tension between the United States and foreign 
countries. Several foreign newspapers and FCPA scholars have criticized 
FCPA regulation of foreign entities, describing the intervention as a 
contemporary form of moralizing and “American imperialism.” 174 Even 
though members of Congress specifically identified the need to limit the 
FCPA’s scope to avoid regulating practices that are “normal and accepted” 
in other countries,175 federal agencies have continued to expand and enforce 
the Act’s provisions roughshod in foreign countries. Aggressive 
enforcement of the FCPA has caused foreign citizens and governments to 
“view the [U.S.] regulators not as policemen but as biased referees” who are 
using the FCPA to fulfill their own regulatory interests at the expense of 
 
170 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland 
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 22 (2011) (statement of Michael Mukasey, former 
Att’y Gen. of the United States; Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP).  
171 Levy, supra note 167. 
172  See Koehler, supra note 138, at 929; see also Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic 
Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. 
REV. 489, 530 (2011) (suggesting that the SEC is in a “hyper-aggressive phase,” in which the 
agency “uses a broad understanding of its legal authority, correspondingly broadening the scope of 
liability for the regulated community”).  
173 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 5 (1977) (indicating that one of the goals of the FCPA was 
to improve “the esteem for the United States among the citizens of foreign nations”).  
174 See, e.g., Charles F. Smith & Brittany D. Parling, “American Imperialism”: A Practitioner’s 
Experience with Extraterritorial Enforcement of the FCPA, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 249. 
175 Cf. American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note 18, at 6 (statement of Michael 
F. Butler, Vice President and General Counsel, Overseas Private Investment Corporation) 
(highlighting the differences in customs worldwide). 
  
2015] Criminalization of “Relationship Hires” Under the FCPA 1803 
 
foreign business.176 This criticism is particularly relevant in cases in which 
the U.S. government’s investigations in foreign countries are inconsistent 
with the domestic enforcement of similar laws or regulations. 177  For 
instance, neither DOJ nor the SEC has pursued any relationship hire 
investigations in domestic offices of American companies—even though 
nepotism remains a common practice in the United States, in both financial 
institutions178 and government.179 In Arthur Levitt’s scathing critique of the 
JPMorgan investigation, he remarks that “if you walk the halls of any 
institution in the United States—Congress, federal courthouses, large 
corporations, the White House, American embassies and even the offices of 
the SEC—you are likely to run into friends and family members of 
powerful and wealthy people.”180 The widespread nature of nepotism in 
U.S. institutions makes the government’s accusations against JPMorgan 
seem hypocritical and imperialistic.  
4. The Waning Benefits of Cooperation 
To be sure, the wide application of the FCPA encourages 
communication between the government and corporations. The current rise 
in voluntary disclosures, review requests, and opinion releases demonstrates 
what may be seen as a collaborative approach to interpreting the Act’s 
provisions. 181  This frequent communication allows the government to 
 
176 See Smith & Parling, supra note 174, at 254.  
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MANAGEMENT DIVISION 2-5 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/ 
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positions for relatives or otherwise violated anti-nepotism policies); Terry Frieden, Inspector 
General Probe Finds Nepotism in Justice Department Unit, CNN ( July 26, 2012, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/26/us/justice-department-nepotism, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
MJB5-ZJ4E (noting that the DOJ Inspector General found nepotism in 2004 and 2008 
investigations).  
180 Levitt, supra note 14. 
181 See Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & David S. Lorello, The Uncertain Calculus of 
FCPA Voluntary Disclosures 2-6 (Mar. 27, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/spring07/World%20Bank%20Anticorruption%20Programs/Lo
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capitalize on the informational advantage of corporations and develop more 
effective regulation of corporate behavior. The fruits of this communication, 
however, will be realized only if companies continue to cooperate with the 
government. A recent study examining FCPA actions from 2004 to 2011 
concluded that while “[m]ore egregious and extensive FCPA violations 
correlate with greater penalties, as does involvement of a foreign 
regulator . . . [,] voluntary disclosure, as well as cooperation and 
remediation, are not correlated with lower FCPA penalties.”182 If additional 
studies or investigations report similar findings, then corporations may be 
less willing to continue cooperating with the government in the future, 
particularly if they believe that they have actually committed FCPA 
violations. Such a system would be inefficient because the government’s 
sources for information about potential violations will be limited to its own 
investigations and whistleblower complaints—neither of which is 
commensurate with corporations’ informational advantage. 
CONCLUSION 
DOJ and SEC investigations into the hiring practices of banks are still 
ongoing, and both agencies have been reluctant to share information on 
these investigations with the public. Regardless of the outcomes of these 
probes, the government’s decision to pursue these investigations without 
evidence of sham employment is troubling. The rationale for “relationship 
hire” investigations calls for an interpretation of the FCPA that exceeds the 
intended scope and purpose of the legislation. More importantly, this 
expansive reading of the Act’s provisions, coupled with rigorous 
enforcement, will likely impair business relations overseas, allow 
prosecutors to control the manner and disposition of all FCPA resolutions, 
and yield undesirable foreign policy consequences. The government should 
confront these legal and policy arguments if it intends to continue broad 
FCPA investigation and enforcement. In the absence of a meaningful 
discussion, the FCPA will less effectively eliminate public corruption and 
improve foreign perceptions of U.S. corporations.  
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